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Abstract: Stephen White focuses his attention on what he calls “depth” experiences 
and the role that cultivating such experiences could have in public life in 
a democracy. Depth experiences are those transformative experiences that 
lead people to question the values that they had previously assumed and 
to alter their sense of purpose. These moments come in “positive” and 
“negative” forms, White says: some are felt as experiences of abundance, 
integrity, or meaningfulness which White calls experiences of fullness, and 
others are felt as experiences of absence, alienation, loss, and limitation, 
which White calls experiences of dearth. My aim here is not to capture 
White’s proposal in all of its richness but only to provide a constructive, 
“bridge-building” response to it from a process perspective. This response 
makes three points: two noting important areas of agreement between his 
approach and a process approach to political theory, and the third noting 
an important tension. 
 
 
  
First: constructive post-modernism 
 
Let me begin by putting into context Professor White’s project (that is, 
both today’s paper and the trajectory of his work in general). My map will 
be simple—without, I hope, misrepresenting. Imagine process thought 
and postmodern thought as two intellectual traditions. Process thinkers 
trace their intellectual lineage along lines of inheritance that run from 
Alfred North Whitehead, to Charles Hartshorne, John Cobb, Schubert 
Ogden, and their students. Postmodern thinkers trace their intellectual 
lineage along lines of inheritance that run from Nietzsche, to Martin 
Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and their students. When 
I was a graduate student at the University of Chicago, in the early 1990s, 
these two lineages were not much in conversation. In fact, the process 
attempt to provide cosmological support for the ideals of civilization and 
the postmodern attempt to overcome metaphysics seemed to be goals that 
were not simply different, but actually opposed to each other. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, the first explicit overture from process 
thought to postmodernism (or “bridge to nowhere”?) was begun by 
David Ray Griffin.1 Griffin argues that process thought actually is a form 
of postmodern thought. It is a form of postmodern thought, he argues, 
in that process thinkers clearly reject the central views of modernism. 
In a rigorous and careful account, Griffin shows how the process 
thinkers reject what he calls naturalismsam, that is, the epistemological 
and ontological commitments that undergird the positivist view that 
makes technological science the paradigm of rationality.2 But his 
argument is not that the process tradition has the same goals as the 
postmodern thinkers mentioned above. Griffin distinguishes between 
two forms of postmodernism: “deconstructive postmodernism” and 
“constructive postmodernism.” Deconstructive postmodernism, he 
says in the introduction to each book in the series, “overcomes the 
modern worldview through an anti-worldview; it seeks to overcome 
the modern worldview by eliminating the possibility of worldviews as 
such, rather than by constructing a postmodern worldview through a 
revision of modern premises and concepts” (see Griffin, x). Constructing 
a worldview through a revision of modern premises and concepts is the 
task of constructive postmodernism. One might say, then, that Griffin 
does not collapse the two intellectual movements, but he does take a step 
from the process camp towards the postmodern constellation. 
 
Stephen White’s paper and his larger project can now be better understood 
as taking a step from the postmodern camp towards the process 
tradition—or, at least, as taking a step towards that common task of 
constructive postmodernism. White writes from within the postmodern 
tradition, but he has argued elsewhere not only that this tradition has 
done a poor job thinking about constructive political questions, but that 
no adequate approach to ethics or politics could possibly come out of a 
position like Heidegger’s or the post-structuralists’. What is missing in 
that form of political thinking, White says, is a means of adjudicating 
rival claims in the political sphere. In other words, the pluralistic reality of 
politics always raises the idea of the legitimacy of one’s norms. As he has 
written, politics “must be conceived as somehow built up out of courses 
of interaction in which claims are raised and agents are held responsible 
to normative expectations. And this complex of interaction . . . cannot  
possibly be scrubbed free of the associated concepts of rightness, justice, 
or legitimacy” (White, Political 49). 
 
White’s work is thus postmodern in that he shares with those thinkers 
skepticism towards metanarratives or master narratives. But his postmodernism 
nevertheless can, like process thought, equally be called constructive 
since, like Griffin, White does not want to jettison but rather reinvestigate 
the experiences of a fullness or a dearth of meaning, the human condition, 
and the world that presences. 
 
 
Second: the return of ontology 
 
Characteristic of the linguistic turn in 20th philosophy, both in Anglophone 
and Continental philosophy, was the metaphor that language acts as a screen 
between the subject and her experience of the world. In that metaphor, 
language “mediates” everything we know and subjects do not have direct 
access to the world. We are insulated from reality by our language, 
according to that view, and metaphysics loses its place as the central task 
of philosophy. Given their commitment to constructive postmodernism, 
however, both process thinkers and White see human values as grounded in 
our experiences of the world, and there is a return to ontological questions 
about what the world is like. Our moral and political values are not just 
words or texts or language; those values are experienced. 
 
White writes, in a nice phrase in his paper here, of “the ethical-political 
promise [that depth experience] carries.” Our affirmations are not simply 
the assertions of a will to power, projected outward onto the world either 
from the individual or from the culture from our subjectivity. Instead, 
the basic source of the self is some understanding of the world, some reality 
to which one responds as to a call. Against those postmoderns who 
say that there are no facts, only interpretations, White responds: “depth 
experience is not simply phenomenological putty into which we impress 
our will. Rather it moves us.” This turn to the ontological is something 
process thinkers share. 
 
Moreover, not only do process thinkers and White agree that values 
are located in our experiences of the world, but they also agree that the 
world is best understood as in a process of presencing or becoming. The 
world is experienced as the source from which everything springs and 
then passes away. White therefore recommends the cultivation of experiences 
of fullness so that one can fold one’s meaning into a felt resonance 
between one’s life and the irrepressible movement, the ebb and flow of  
all life. Though it would not be accurate to describe him as a process 
philosopher, White clearly finds temporal language a good vocabulary for 
his analysis of the way the world is experienced. As he writes elsewhere: 
“Presencing [of things is] utterly plural, unstable, motile, and unhierarchical” 
and the “‘a-priori’ of any possible economy of presence” is the 
“event-like distributing of presence-absence” (White, Political 45, 44). 
Process thinkers share White’s opposition to an ontology that grounds 
one’s identity as secure and that denies difference and change. Given this 
ontological understanding of the world, the two sides are close. 
 
 
 
Third: strong vs. Weak ontology 
 
Now to my third and last point, the tension between White’s project and 
process thought. Although White is unlike deconstructive postmodern 
thinkers in his willingness to talk about the character of the world in general, 
he distinguishes between what he calls a “strong” ontology (which, 
in his judgment, overreaches) and a “weak” ontology (which he recommends— 
see White, Sustaining). Given this distinction, the connections he 
explores between one’s political self-understanding and one’s understanding 
of the character of the world may be fundamentally different from those 
developed by process thinkers. 
 
A strong ontology is found in those traditional metaphysical views that 
seek to provide a certain or uncontestable foundation for our identities 
and our values. Here (as he puts it elsewhere), one claims that one’s values 
are “laid down in nature” and “the world simply is that way” (White, 
Political 29, 28). Here (as he puts it in this article), one’s ontology provides 
a “grounding certainty” and the conviction that one’s own depth 
experiences reveal “a truth that applies to all” or a “universal truth.” A 
weak ontology, by contrast, does not claim that our values are “powered 
by any sort of transcendent spark.” I suspect that a great deal of process 
thought seems to White (and many others) like a “strong” ontology and 
that therefore—despite their dual membership in the constructive postmodernism 
club, and despite their shared predilection for the language 
of becoming, pluralism, and flux—there are postmodernists who will not 
want to embrace it. Given a justifiable skepticism towards claims that are 
alleged to be true for everyone, always, and everywhere, some postmodern 
thinkers seek to reject all forms of metaphysics. There is the tension. 
 
If we want to build bridges between these two traditions, if we want to 
put the process approach in conversation with the Continental thinkers  
with whom White engages, then it seems to me that there are two ways 
process thinkers might make their case: the first would be to focus on 
the aspects of process thought that register as a “weak” ontology. How 
might process thought count as “weak”? To begin, all process thinkers 
reject traditional (or “classical”) metaphysics, and they would agree with 
White’s concern that to ground one’s identity in an unchanging reality (an 
unmoved God or a Platonic Idea) is an example of a strong ontology that 
is as ethically dangerous as it is ontologically suspect. Moreover, process 
thinkers also reject the “strong” idea that metaphysical claims provide us 
with certainty. This worry about claiming infallibility for one’s politics 
pervades White’s paper, but on this issue he would find an ally in every 
process thinker since Whitehead. The best account I know of how process 
thought rejects the quest for existential or cognitive certainty and rejects the 
idea that metaphysical arguments are meant to compel assent is in William 
Meyer’s masterful and pellucid Metaphysics and the Future of Theology. So, 
if a “weak” ontology is an approach that allows for ultimate commitments 
that simultaneously acknowledge their own historical, fallible, contestable 
character, then process thought—including process thought that seeks to 
ground political norms in metaphysical truths—can be seen as “weak.” 
 
But there are elements of process tradition (especially in what is 
sometimes called the rationalist tradition in process thought that includes 
Hartshorne, Ogden, Gamwell, and Meyer, and which has been prominent 
at the University of Chicago) that are “strong.” How might one make 
the case for a “strong” ontology to a postmodern audience? I will close 
my response by saying a word in defense of two “strong” ideas. First, 
“universal truths.” The goal of metaphysics is to make generalizations that 
are completely unrestricted, that are true “always and everywhere.” So, 
despite the insistence of process thinkers on the fallibility of our claims, 
the goal of metaphysics as it is practiced by process thinkers is accurately 
to describe the way that the world in general is. Therefore, if one succeeds 
at making a true claim about the human condition, about human experience 
in general or reality as such, then this is by definition “a truth that 
applies to all.” However, process thinkers take seriously the distinction 
between the scope of one’s ontological claims (which seek to be universal) 
and how one holds that claim (which, for process thinkers, is always: fallibly). 
Given that distinction, one can, so to speak, make strong claims 
weakly. Making this distinction may alleviate some postmodern anxiety 
about a “strong” ontology. 
 
 My second comment in defense of a “strong” ontology concerns 
transcendental arguments, perhaps a quintessential element of a “strong” 
approach. In this paper, White invites us to reflect upon and bring to 
explicit consciousness the guiding and perhaps unexamined assumptions 
of our practical life. This is a project that process philosophers share. White 
writes that when we look at our depth experiences, there are features 
of our practical life—our mortality, temporality, finitude—that should 
guide us, putting a drag on our will to sovereignty and encouraging our 
dispositions of generosity. Amen. The question is whether mortality, 
temporality, and finitude are examples of what White has called “planted 
evidence”—that is, evidence that has been planted in our experience by 
Western modernity—or whether these are instead “strong” features of 
the human condition as such. Is the claim that I am merely a finite part 
of the whole of the world something that is true only sometimes or only 
in the modern West? Or is it rather true in the strong sense, always and 
everywhere true? If the latter, then it seems that these are ineliminable or 
transcendental features of all human practices—and therefore they are also 
eliminable or transcendental features of all political practice. I should like 
to think that even these claims about our world, as metaphysically strong 
as they are, can be held in a way that is humble and open to revision in 
the responsible way that properly defines the political sphere. 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. I am referring here to the book series edited by Griffin entitled Constructive 
Postmodern Thought, published by the State University of New York Press. 
Begun in 1988 and continuing to the present, the series includes over thirty 
volumes so far. 
 
2. Naturalismsam refers to a version of naturalism that endorses a sensationalist 
epistemology, atheism, and a materialist ontology. 
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